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Abstract: Strong institutions and accountable governments are imperative for national 
prosperity. Yet the development of such institutions has presented a continuous challenge 
for many countries around the world. In this study we bring attention to the negative 
implications of global interdependence and institutional arbitrage opportunities that enable 
economic actors to solve for institutional weaknesses and constraints in the domestic 
realm by using foreign institutions. We argue that such opportunities lower the propensity 
of asset-holders, presumably interested in strong institutions at home, to organize the 
collective action and take the risk of lobbying for better institutions. Based on the case of 
post-Soviet Russia we demonstrate the main ways through which Russia’s capital-owners 
make use of foreign legal and financial infrastructures such as capital flight, the use of 
foreign corporate structures, offshore financial centers, real estate markets, the round-
tripping of foreign direct investment, and reliance on foreign law in contract-writing and 
foreign courts in dispute-resolution. 
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Russia, the largest and most significant country to emerge after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, by 2015 had abandoned its two and a half decades-long transition to the Western 
model of capitalism and democracy. Its gradual slide towards authoritarianism was 
enabled by the curtailment and weakening of governance, private property and the rule of 
law. Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin the agenda for building and strengthening 
governing institutions, that have long been argued to constitute the basis for national 
prosperity, has been abandoned, giving way to an increased domestic cronyism and 
belligerent foreign policy.  
 
To explain this latest authoritarian turn and institutional deterioration in Russia most 
analysts focused on domestic issues: Russia’s super- and patronal presidentialism, partial 
reforms and resource curse, kleptocracy and corruption, historical legacies and political 
culture.1 Methodological nationalism–-the uncritical acceptance of the national scale as 
given–-has been also predominant in the comparative study of governance and 
institutions.2 Yet how warranted are such approaches in an era of globalization and ‘new 
interdependence,’ when transnational interactions shape domestic institutions,3 and when 
economic actors switch between distinct institutional environments to “exploit aspects of 
one to solve for a constraint in the other?”4 Transnational influences did find their way 
into studies of democratization. Samuel Huntingon first noted that late democratizers 
could rely on ‘snowballing’ from earlier transformations. More recent studies of 
international diffusion of electoral revolutions underscored this idea as well.5 The 
conventional wisdom on the origins of good governance and strong institutions however 
maintains a heavy ‘domestic origins’ bias and, as many scholars agree, is still 
insufficient.6 
 
When the Soviet Union collapsed and the new post-Soviet states embarked on the path of 
market reforms, both Western policy advisors and Russia’s reformers hoped that reforms 
would be self-reinforcing.7 The creation of private property itself was seen as an 
accomplishment sufficient for the reforms to stick because it was assumed that the new 
property owners would create a demand for good governance and secure property rights.8 
When it became clear that such demand would not emerge automatically, these 
expectations were modified (specifically in Russia) to highlight the role of ‘effective’ 
owners, economic agents who had real control over property, like majority holders.9  
Sometimes even raiding conflicts were represented as property changing hands from 
‘weak’ to ‘more effective’ owners.10 But contrary to these expectations, the rise of real 
owners in the process of economic transition did not result in better institutions for 
protecting property rights.   
 
Another conventional wisdom on institutional evolution was tested as Russia’s political 
regime turned more authoritarian and personalistic in the 2000s. This time it was Mancur 
Olson’s hypotheses on the positive effects of replacing ‘roving’ with ‘stationary’ 
bandits.11 As Olson argued, stationary bandits have a stake in seeing their sovereign 
dominion grow and prosper and therefore they tax less, commit more credibly, and 
provide other public goods in order to stabilize their domain and provide for long-term 
maximization of profits. Vladimir Putin indeed sought to stabilize his rule, partially by 
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allowing economic elites close to the Kremlin to enrich themselves. Despite the growth in 
the number of billionaires in Russia, however, institutional quality only worsened and the 
cronyism within the executive branch increased.12  These developments took place even 
while the ‘demand for law’ steadily grew as Russian businesses increased reliance on 
courts of arbitration and other legal means to resolve disputes.13 Some scholars argued that 
the threat to property shifted from private sector transgressions to sub rosa controls by 
Kremlin cronies, and even Putin himself, highlighting the worsening institutional 
environment in Russia.14  
 
In this study we counter the common national bend in the literature but bring attention to 
global institutional factors that condition domestic institutional evolution. More 
specifically, we explore the unintended consequences for ‘good governance’ prospects in 
transition countries of institutional arbitrage opportunities available for big businesses 
relying on economic, financial, administrative and legal institutions abroad.  Escaping 
imperfect institutional environment at home and taking advantage of various foreign 
institutions, business actors substitute and compensate for the weakness of home 
institutions.  But what does this mean for the long-term prospects of institutional reforms 
at home?  Who will work to change the domestic institutional status quo if the largest 
stakeholders – the big business owners– not only find transnational venues to protect their 
assets but might even see advantages in maintaining weak institutions at home?  
 
Russia represents a paradigmatic case illustrating the dark side of globalization.  It 
emerged as a new country after the fall of the Soviet Union and faced the challenges of 
economic reform, institution-building and political transformation while simultaneously 
integrating into the global economy. Russia is thus a great laboratory for studying the 
complex inter-linkages between domestic politics, institution-building, and global forces 
and opportunities. Unlike its predecessor, post-Soviet Russia did not shun globalization. 
Over the last two decades and a half, propped up by its energy riches, it became an 
essential part of the global economy and global financial markets. Russian oligarchs built 
their financial and business empires mostly from natural resource extraction, and they 
have benefitted handsomely from entry into global markets. They have joined the global 
upper class, impacting property values and financial and political institutions not only in 
Moscow but also in London, New York and Monaco.15  
 
Yet Russia’s democratic landscape – including its law-making and political party system, 
its judiciary and law enforcement, and civil society and the press – has been on a 
downward slope as Russia’s president has reached for ‘manual control,’ shifting Russia’s 
political system strongly in the direction of personalism.  Despite expectations to the 
contrary, the economic actors who benefitted most from Russia’s economic transformation 
and globalization, have not lobbied openly for a rule-of-law state and, instead, they have 
preferred to collaborate with the increasingly kleptocratic regime to make money inside 
Russia that they can take abroad.16  
 
Russia is far from unique in this story. Weak institutions and non-accountable regimes 
appear to be a norm in many parts of the world.  The significance of this problem – the 
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role of global forces in shaping domestic institutions – reaches far beyond Russia and is 
pertinent to other countries with weak controls on the export of domestic capital. Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, China, and Uzbekistan are just a few additional Eurasian examples; the entire 
universe of cases extends to Africa, Asia and Latin America. An exploration of this 
puzzle–-why a country’s economic elites might not over time press for institutions 
supporting property rights, political and civil freedoms and the rule of law–-brings 
scholarly and policy-communities’ attention to the forces that shape institution-building in 
the present-day global environment.  Understanding the impact of globalization on 
contemporary efforts to build robust rule of law regimes will not only provide a better 
understanding of these processes but may also assist in the development of policy 
recommendations by those international institutions such as the World Bank or the IMF 
seeking to promote ‘good governance’ and strong institutions. 
   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we adopt political 
economist Albert Hirschman’s ‘exit, voice and loyalty’ framework to explain one of the 
central dilemmas of institution-building in transition and developing countries and situate 
it in the existing literature on institutions and development. This section lays out the 
concept of institutional arbitrage, importing insights from international economics and 
business management studies into political science. We then review the analysis of 
institutions in Russia-focused scholarship including the discussion of central expectations 
and realities of Russian transition. The subsequent section presents the empirical data on 
the primary institutional exit strategies practiced by Russian capitalists. In the last section 
we discuss the central analytical and policy implications of our argument, including the 
role of the West both in enabling and in countering the negative effects of such global 
institutional interdependence. While no easy solutions are available to the problem 
identified in this study, learning the past lessons of institutional transformation in the 
context of globalization is paramount for developing the global economy and institutions 
that can underpin peace and stability worldwide.  
 
Development, Institution-Building, and the Modern Dilemmas of Exit and Voice 
The centrality of institutional quality for a country’s development and economic 
prosperity has emerged as a shared truth that has shaped not only theory but also the 
policymaking world.17  The laws enacted and enforced by a country, and specifically those 
related to property rights and limited government, appear paramount in determining the 
economic growth potential of a country.18 But where do good institutions come from?  
 
Policymakers have learned that simply transplanting good institutions from one country to 
another rarely works.19 Institutional change is a slow process shaped by previous 
institutions, economic conditions and popular expectations. Most influential recent 
scholarship on this question has focused on the political foundations of ‘good’ institutions. 
Whether in North and Weingast’s seminal analysis of the origins of credible commitment 
in seventeenth century England or in more recent attempts to explain ‘why nations fail,’ 
politics emerges as the central determinant of institutional quality.20  More specifically, 
most accounts conclude that change only occurs through the domestic struggle of rival 
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political elites—particularly economic elites–to challenge and limit sovereign authority by 
establishing the rule of law.21   
 
But the role of global institutions in shaping, and even undermining, transformation 
toward rule-of-law regimes domestically is not always considered.  To be sure, some 
scholars have been cognizant of this transformational force highlighting, long ago, new 
political challenges wrought by the forces of financial internationalization and increased 
capital mobility. Bates and Lien first brought attention to the changing power dynamic 
between the capital owners and the state produced by capital mobility.22 Carles Boix has 
also recently argued that the capital flight curbs redistributive pressures, forces 
governments to lower taxes, and reduces political conflict among capital holders and 
nonholders, thereby increasing the likelihood of democracy.23 Opposing these optimistic 
arguments, Cai and Treisman raised concerns about their unrealistic assumptions.24 We 
follow their lead and challenge these expectations about the effects of capital mobility on 
domestic institutions. Reality begs to differ. Unaccountable governments and weak 
institutions could be compatible with–and even in the interest of–highly mobile capital. 
Even further, capital mobility might be part and parcel of the broader political- economic 
arrangement whereby business elites take advantage of weak institutions at home to make 
profits, while using strong institutions abroad to safeguard them.25 We call this 
phenomenon institutional arbitrage.     
 
Institutional Arbitrage 
Almost half a decade ago Albert Hirschman advanced his highly acclaimed analytical 
framework for analyzing the behavior of firms’ employees and owners in the context of 
inadequate organizational performance.  Hirschman found that some members might 
exercise the exit option by leaving the organization, while others would voice their 
concerns to the management. This simple framework also applies to the dilemmas of 
institution-building in the context of the highly integrated global economy that nations 
face today. As domestic financial systems become increasingly integrated into global 
financial markets and institutions, economic actors face expanding opportunities to exit 
unfavorable domestic institutional constraints in favor of improved conditions abroad. A 
dense institutional infrastructure underpins the global economy and, more particularly, the 
global financial sector with international banks, offshore financial zones, and foreign legal 
institutions that are open for use by foreign clients. They all play a role in providing an 
exit strategy for businesses concerned with conditions at home.  
 
Economic elites all over the world seek lower taxes and laxer regulations, but in predatory 
states they also seek to escape insecure property rights and unstable legal regimes. U.S. 
and other Western multinationals, for example, compensate for relatively high corporate 
taxes at home by moving their legal headquarters to lower-tax countries. In countries like 
Russia, where businesses have access to high short-term gains but are uncertain about both 
the security of their property rights and their long-term profits, they take advantage of 
global opportunities to secure their assets abroad.   
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Exit strategies represent a form of institutional ‘escape’ and reflect the higher costs 
associated with the voice strategy. As Hirschman argued, “voice is political action par 
excellence.”26 Resorting to voice signifies an attempt to change rather than to escape from 
an undesirable condition. Because it is more costly, its exercise is dependent on the 
availability of exit options. The voice option becomes preferred “whenever the exit option 
is unavailable.”27 It stands to reason that when exit is available at a relatively low cost, 
actors will choose it over voice, and in so doing lessen their propensity to promote 
institutional reforms at home.  Businesses can safeguard their interests abroad whether 
through diverting their assets into foreign banks and offshore companies or by using 
foreign laws and courts to resolve disputes with other economic actors. In these ways, 
their incentives to organize and engage in collective action to reform institutions at home 
could be expected to decline considerably.  
 
Such considerations are especially important in countries where collective action is 
discouraged or even persecuted and the profit-making opportunities are conditional on 
deference to authority. The cost of voice in such countries –a defining characteristic of 
authoritarian regimes– far exceeds the cost of exit. This logic operates even more 
disturbingly in countries like Russia where selected big businesses closely connected to 
government officials can maximize short-term gains by limiting institutional protections 
for labor, property and the environment. At the same time, they successfully expatriate 
their profits abroad through non-transparent channels to avoid future accountability.  
 
The opportunity for firms to exploit the differences between institutional environments in 
different countries has been captured using the term institutional arbitrage.28 Institutional 
arbitrage refers to strategies used by firms to locate all or part of their operations in the 
most favorable institutional environments. Such strategies have been explored empirically 
in economics and management studies, especially regarding firms expanding overseas, 
primarily to China. Unlike the case of outsourcing to China, however, mostly for the 
reasons of cheap labor and lax environmental regulation and while keeping corporate 
headquarters in the sending country, Russian entrepreneurs moved their corporate 
headquarters or major subsidiaries abroad, while maintaining their production facilities at 
home. Going against the conventional wisdom of treating firms’ internationalization as a 
strategic entry into foreign markets, the concept of institutional arbitrage sees these 
activities as a strategic exit from the domestic market to exploit better legal and financial 
institutions abroad.29  
 
Analysts who have explored corporate strategies for safeguarding economic assets from 
political extraction have found that a country’s institutional quality shapes firms’ decisions 
on the amount of liquid assets held.  Economic actors in less secure and more politically 
corrupt countries tend to channel their cash into assets that are harder for the state to 
capture.30 Unsurprisingly, political instability is a key variable associated with capital 
flight and represents one of the indicators of the prevalence of institutional ‘exit’ strategies 
employed by economic elites.31  
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The linkage between financial flows and domestic institutions has also been made in a 
recent study that explored the impact of globalization on the domestic financial system. 
Noting that financial capital and foreign direct investments (FDI) tend to flow in opposite 
directions, economists Jiandong Ju and Shang-Jin Wei showed that developed countries 
with strong institutions import capital and export FDI primarily to developing countries.32 
They have concluded based on their analysis that developed countries benefit from 
globalization more than developing countries and suggested, along the lines we argue 
here, that, “financial globalization is a substitute for domestic financial reforms as capital 
can be put to the most efficient use even without domestic reforms.”33   
 
Given this growing research in the field of international economics, finance and 
management studies, it is past time to import the key insights from this literature into 
political science and explore further the institutional implications of these 
internationalization strategies employed by businesses.  Private actors, especially big 
businesses interested in institutional stability and profit maximization, are frequently 
considered the main stakeholders in promoting well-functioning market institutions, 
including those fundamental ones that guarantee property rights and the security of 
contracts.  The institutional exit option exercised by these actors on a large scale might be 
at the bottom of the institutional ‘trap’ emerging countries like Russia find themselves in 
as their own business elites lose the incentive to fight for better domestic institutions.34  
 
Capitalism, Politics and Institutions in Russia: Private Agency Under Conditions of 
Limited Collective Action   
It has never been easy to be a capitalist in new Russia. In the absence of effective market 
and state institutions capable of protecting private owners, private predation and violent 
entrepreneurship seized the day in the 1990s.35 Later on, during the 2000s, private threats 
to businesses were replaced by predation originating from state officials.36 With the 
political regime turning more authoritarian and personalistic, institutional quality only 
worsened, and the arbitrariness of the executive branch only increased.37 These 
developments took place even while the ‘demand for law’ steadily increased in Russia and 
business actors’ reliance on courts of arbitration and other legal means to resolve disputes 
grew.38 Russia’s arbitration courts presented one of the very few cases of institutional 
improvement and growing transparency; yet even these developments were offset by the 
2014 decision to abolish the Supreme Arbitration Court, putting its functions within the 
Supreme Court, a decision made without any significant public debate or input from 
Russia’s business community.39   
 
Russia’s nascent capitalists did engage in some collective action to promote and defend 
their interests. Business associations such as the Russian Union of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs (RUIE), the Chambers of Commerce and Industry (CCI), Delovaya Rossiya 
(a public organization for the non-extractive sector of the economy), Opora Rossii (an 
organization representing the interests of small and medium size enterprises), and 
Business Solidarity (an organization created to directly defend its members against illegal 
attacks) have been founded, among many others, at times in response to perceived 
corruption and hostile takeovers, or facilitated by government officials as sector-specific 
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representation vehicles.40  Membership in these organizations has been associated with a 
host of positive indicators for firms such as a greater capacity to lobby for specific laws 
and regulations at the federal and regional levels, a greater proclivity to appeal to courts 
and other government agencies in the event of predatory inspections, and even a higher 
propensity to invest.41 Yet numerous cases of state-led violence against businesses, 
starting with the YUKOS case in 2003, underscore the extreme weakness of business 
associations vis-à-vis the state.42 A group of economists from Moscow’s Higher School of 
Economics concluded: “Despite the importance of associations as fora for dialogue 
between the state and business, the associations did not acquire genuine levers of control 
over the enforcement of the reached agreements.”43  
 
As predatory actions by the state have increased, one would expect stakeholder alliances 
both with local communities in which companies or factories are located and with foreign 
companies that have invested in joint projects with Russian companies.44  But as we argue 
in this study, ‘exit’ to foreign institutions has prevailed against failing domestic 
institutions. Individuals’ private adaptation to conditions of implausible or ineffective 
collective action has clearly occurred.  
 
It should not come as a surprise that the political significance of big businesses for 
institutional development should be expected to be greater than that of small or medium-
size businesses.45 Businesses differ in terms of the resources – whether economic, social 
or political–-that they can bring to the table, especially if it is a case of negotiating with 
the government or a single ruler. This is especially true in the Russian context of extreme 
economic concentration, where 35% of the country’s wealth is controlled by 100 or so 
oligarchs, while small and medium size businesses have struggled to survive, as reflected 
in their diminishing numbers.46 The share of small and medium businesses in Russia’s 
GDP is estimated at 20-25%, lower than their normal share in both developed and 
developing countries.47 One might expect in such conditions that the super-rich who 
control most of the resources would be crucial for institutional reforms; especially those 
that are designed to constrain the ruler’s arbitrary power. They have, supposedly, most to 
lose from the institutional instability and unpredictability associated with the arbitrariness 
of personal power. Why then did the super-rich not push for better institutions and secure 
property rights in Russia?   
 
The economist Konstantin Sonin has suggested that, if anything, the super-rich in Russia 
might have a particular disinterest in promoting strong institutions and property rights 
protection because, (1) they have the resources to invest in private protection; and (2) 
equipped with those mechanisms, they are better positioned to take advantage of 
institutional unpredictability and the potential redistributive opportunities that might 
emerge.48  Furthermore, high inequality might be inimical to high quality institutions and 
secure property rights because the ruling elite in such contexts is able to appropriate a 
disproportionate share of the aggregate investment at the expense of the rest of the 
population since they control both market entry and any policy-making that would affect 
redistribution.49 Qualitative empirical analysis of capitalist behavior in post-Soviet 
autocracies has revealed that prosperous businesses indeed see enormous advantages to 
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the status quo that provides them with access to patronage, rents, and other opportunities 
to exploit the loopholes and market distortions.50 The owners of big businesses are not 
likely to publicly challenge their rulers. Still, there are cases of ‘capitalist defection’ and 
political acts challenging the regime and calling for institutional reforms, even in such 
closed, autocratic, and state-dominated countries as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. These 
incidents are rare and are unfailingly triggered by raiding conflicts and challenges to 
property rights as Barbara Junisbai argues.51 Such exceptions, as when Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, the owner of Yukos, challenged the system to improve its institutions, are 
noteworthy. They highlight that post-Soviet capitalists are not irrational in their preference 
for weak institutions. They can accept such institutions to the extent that they can exploit 
them while still safeguarding their assets. When their assets are under threat, they defect 
and attempt to mobilize opposition to change institutions. The fact that such defections are 
so rare reveals that business owners have found other mechanisms to protect their wealth. 
As we show next, they do that with the help of foreign institutions.     
 
 
Protecting Wealth Abroad: Lessons from Russia  
Although international capital movements are not a novel phenomenon, the foundations of 
the contemporary global financial system emerged in the 1970s after the removal of 
Bretton Woods capital controls between industrial countries. Capital liberalization 
between industrial and developing economies followed in the 1980s.  Technological 
advancements in information and computer technologies further propelled financial 
globalization and integration, deepening global financial markets and, among other things, 
leading to the emergence of new international financial hubs, many of which also acted as 
tax havens or offshore financial centers.52 These are jurisdictions with special legal 
regimes that not only enable capital holders to avoid taxes, but also in many cases allow 
the actual or ‘beneficial’ owners to maintain secrecy and anonymity. Economic actors 
situated in various countries can easily create ‘shell’ companies, trusts, and other 
corporate vehicles to move funds from one jurisdiction to another and “exploit aspects of 
one [institutional environment] to solve for a constraint in the other.”53  
 
By the time Russia set out on the path of integrating into the global economy in the early 
1990s, the global financial institutional framework had already been established. Russia’s 
new capitalists made quick use of it. Stiglitz and Hoff reiterated the widely held 
conclusion about the transition in Russia that “the transfer of state property to private 
hands was accompanied by the stripping of Russia’s assets.”54  The first reaction of those 
elites who had access to the funds, logically, was to hide their involvement. Using foreign 
jurisdictions and new legal opportunities was at the core of the new Russian capitalists’ 
‘securitization’ strategy. Such reliance on foreign institutions continued and even 
intensified later, as asset-holders discovered that they could rely on foreign courts for 
dispute-resolution and, more generally, secure their future.  In the remainder of this study, 
we discuss the main ways in which Russia’s capital-owners rely on foreign legal and 
financial infrastructures, as reflected in (1) capital flight and the use of foreign corporate 
structures, offshore financial centers, and real estate markets, (2) the round-tripping of 
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foreign direct investment, and (3) reliance on foreign law in contract-writing and foreign 
courts in dispute-resolution. 
 
Where Does Capital Fly To? Offshores and Real Estate Markets 
After the Soviet collapse Russia became a country that funneled massive financial 
resources into the world economy.  This flow was absorbed mostly by banks in the U.S., 
Germany, the UK and other countries, arguably fuelling economic growth and expansion 
of the financial services sector in the receiving states.55 Capital started leaving Russia 
already during the late Soviet period. In 1990-1991, the Soviet security services organized 
a massive transfer of funds associated with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to 
bank accounts established abroad.56 This outflow intensified with the economic reforms of 
the early 1990s and has been an ongoing process ever since.   
 
Estimates of the scale of capital flight vary depending on the methodology used to 
measure it.  Figures for the 1990s, for example, vary between $100-200 billion.57 Even 
lacking the desired precision, the estimates are large enough to highlight the scale of the 
problem. Economists have argued that the size of the capital flight, combined with slow or 
negative domestic growth, indicates that the decision to take the money abroad was not a 
result of the desire for profit maximization or investment diversification. Rather, it was a 
response to economic and political instability, weak institutions and ineffective 
regulation.58  
 
Even when the economic situation improved in the 2000s and capital started to return 
through ‘round-tripping’ (as discussed in the next section), capital outflows still prevailed 
over inflows.  In short, while business elites—both Russian and foreign—found Russia 
economically attractive in the short-term, they ended up taking more out of the country 
than they brought in.  Analysts note, in addition, that outward FDI (OFDI) is statistically 
underestimated because investments are made with the intermediation of foreign business, 
i.e. a Russian company that invests abroad through or with the help of foreign firms.59 
These investments grew dramatically during the years prior to the 2008 global financial 
crisis, with Russia leading this expansion and responsible for around $42 billion in 2007 
alone.60  The underestimation also occurs due to unaccounted illicit financial flows.  When 
illicit flows are taken into account, a recent study by economists from the International 
Monetary Fund and Global Financial Integrity finds that a total of licit and illicit outflows 
from Russia between 1994 and 2011 amounted to $782.5 billion (or about $43.5 billion 
annually, on average).61 The same study estimates that the deliberate misinvoicing of trade 
produced $211.5 billion ($11.8 billion per annum) of illicit flows during the same 
period.62 
 
There are several main channels used to take capital out of the country. Under-invoicing 
of export earnings is a mechanism especially prevalent in the energy sector.63 Much of 
Russia’s oil rents are utilized abroad.  Overstatement of import payments and, related to 
that, use of fake advance import payments is another commonly employed tool. Capital is 
also taken abroad using capital account transactions involving the creation of fictitious 
firms through which funds are transferred to offshore companies.64 A vast global financial 
 11 
industry aids these transactions.  Most of the capital flowing out of Russia lands in 
offshore financial centers.65 Business owners create limited liability, holding and trading 
companies by contributing monetary funds or shares from a Russian company to these 
newly created structures, thereby placing assets under foreign ownership as well as 
corporate and tax laws. Whole sectors of the economy were gutted when Russian-owned 
but foreign-registered subsidiaries were set up to operate offshore while hollowed-out 
mother companies remained registered in Russia. Such offshore holding companies were 
used at the top of the ownership structure of all major Russian companies in the last two 
decades and reflected the major feature of the Russian process of transnationalization.  It 
is estimated that between 70-90% of Russian companies formally belong to companies 
registered in offshore zones.66  Most of Russian exports including the exports by state-
controlled companies are channeled through offshore firms as well. Gazprom alone has 
more than one hundred wholly or majority–owned subsidiaries and affiliated companies 
registered in Russia as of 2014, and another hundred subsidiaries were registered abroad 
already by 2007, including five in the Virgin Islands, nine in Cyprus, seven in 
Switzerland, and two in the Cayman Islands.67  
 
Establishing business in offshore centers has meant that companies can use preferential 
tax regimes and benefit from simplified registration, and, in many cases, anonymity. In the 
late 1990s Russians established 50,000-60,000 offshore companies; by the 2000s the 
number reached 100,000.68 According to the Tax Justice Network, during the period 1990-
2010, Russians have accumulated around $ 800,000 billion in offshore financial centers.69 
The geographical distribution of investments from Russia reveals the dominance of three 
specific offshore centers: Cyprus, the Netherlands and the British Virgin Islands have been 
the predominant destination for Russian capital.  Cyprus by itself has become a major 
landing place for capital from Russia and is home to approximately 14,400 Russian 
companies.70  Table 1 shows that Cyprus alone accounts for around 35-40 % of annual 
outward investments from Russia in the period from 2009 to 2013.71  
 
 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
 
Russia is not unique in these trends. Offshore centers are widely used by transnational 
corporations around the world.72  Currently, approximately 30-50% of global FDI is 
accounted for by networks of offshore shell companies.   Russia’s other neighbors such as 
Kazakhstan or Ukraine exhibit similar tendencies too.  In the case of Ukraine under 
Yanukovych, for example, Cyprus accounted for a whopping 92% of total outward FDI in 
2010.73 However, while companies from the developed countries use offshore zones 
primarily for tax avoidance and regulatory flexibility, Russian and Ukrainian businesses 
pursue the goal of capital concealment and profit concentration, with tax evasion coming 
third in their list of preferences.74  
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Real estate markets in Europe and other parts of the world have become another important 
channel for siphoning capital out of Russia. According to some estimates, in 2011 alone, 
$10 billion flowing out of Russia went into property in EU countries.75  London, in 
particular, has experienced the inflow of “a gigantic geyser of foreign money” and has 
been transformed in the process.76 Much of London’s high-end property market is 
dominated by Russians.77 In 2006, for example, a fifth of all the prime real estate sold for 
above 8 million pounds was bought by Russian buyers.  That proportion was even higher 
for real estate priced above 12 million pounds. The impact of Russian purchases on the 
real estate market in London goes beyond its contribution to property value inflation and 
the concomitant increase in wealth disparities in the city.  Purchases of high-end 
properties are made by the ultra-rich who collect many such properties world-wide and are 
rarely in residence. Whole prestigious neighborhoods in London like Mayfair have been 
depopulated, as properties in the surrounding area are purchased often for their value as 
alternatives to more-strictly regulated bank accounts. In addition, while interest in a bank 
account holding 12 million pounds would be taxed at the maximum rate in the UK, taxes 
on appreciation of properties is tax deferred. And while cash cannot cross one border and 
be deposited in the bank of a second country without being registered and subject to 
regulations designed to deter money laundering, cash is still widely used to purchase high-
end properties world-wide.  And the beneficial owner’s identity can be masked quite 
legally by registering the property in the name of an anonymous LLC. Whole swaths of 
the most prestigious locations in cities from Miami to Monaco are owned by people whose 
identity is unknown.78  
  
Russia’s new role as a major capital provider in the world economy only reinforced the 
reality of Russia being a poor country.  If the money made mostly on the sale of natural 
resources was reinvested domestically and circulated inside Russia, it would have, 
arguably, had a more positive impact on the general welfare of the Russian population.79  
The massive capital outflows that occurred beginning in the 1990s and early 2000s 
amounted to the financial ‘draining’ of Russia’s economy, reducing capital stock available 
for domestic investment and bleeding the country’s effective tax base.80 The Russian 
government is certainly aware of these consequences.  In his December 2012 State of the 
Nation address President Putin advanced a new ‘deoffshorization’ initiative proposing 
measures to bring businesses back to Russia. Concrete legal steps however have been 
taken only in late 2014, when Russia’s Tax Code was amended to include a new law 
designed to counter the use of tax havens to gain tax preferences.81  
 
The reaction of Russian businessmen has been lukewarm, at best. Although a few 
individuals, most notably Alisher Usmanov, have relocated some of their holdings back 
under the Russian jurisdiction, most asset-holders have taken a ‘wait and see’ approach or 
have even tried to change their domicile status to escape the new tax rules.82 Neither the 
capacity of Russia’s Investigative Committee, nor the low level of international 
cooperation under the current geopolitical circumstances is capable of ensuring the 
effective implementation of this ‘deoffshorization’ law.83 Additionally, some offshore 
financial centers have themselves engaged in activities to conform with the new Russian 
laws while continuing to provide safe haven for Russian assets.84 
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Russia’s Round-trip Investors: When Does Capital Return?         
The 7% average annual growth rate Russia experienced between 1999 and 2008 allowed 
for some degree of capital repatriation and re-investment.  Economic analysts have 
captured these processes using the concept of ‘round-tripping,’ which was sometimes 
deemed a distinctive feature of FDI in Russia, where there is “a very high correlation of 
inward and outward investment flows between the country and financial hubs such as 
Cyprus and the British Virgin Islands.”85  For Russia, as Table 1 demonstrates, the places 
capital is heading to have also become the major source countries for capital inflows back 
to Russia.  In the words of a Moscow-based bank analyst, “Most of Cyprus’ Russia-bound 
investments are nothing other than Russian oligarchs’ capital that was shipped overseas 
during the turbulent period of the ‘90s.”86  
 
‘Round-tripping’ capital, i.e. when funds are transferred abroad first and then brought 
back into the country as foreign investment, is an important example of institutional 
arbitrage.  Such a strategy could be used to avoid taxes, hide illicit funds that are “illegally 
earned, transferred or utilized”87 or protect the funds from predatory state or private actors.  
In the case of China, where government policy encourages and privileges foreign investors 
over domestic investors, such strategies are likely to also be motivated by the financial 
incentives provided by the government.  In the case of Russia such incentives are clearly 
absent.  Most analysts, therefore, argue that ‘round-tripping’ is caused by efforts to control 
institutional and political risk factors.88  Russian businessmen tend to use foreign accounts 
not only to secure their legal assets but also to ‘launder’ ill-gotten money and hide their 
identity from corrupt officials in Russia.89  
 
But why would these funds return back into an unsupportive institutional and unsafe 
political environment?  The simple answer is that these ‘foreign investors’–-being not 
foreign at all and, to the contrary, having local knowledge, experience and, frequently, 
insider access to specific economic opportunities–-have comparative advantage vis-à-vis 
genuine foreign investors. A study of economic investment decisions made by ‘round-
trippers’ reveals that their decisions differ significantly from decisions made by genuine 
foreign investors.90  Specifically, round-trip investors display a tendency to invest into 
regions with higher resource potential and greater corruption levels, while genuine foreign 
investors tend to prefer regions with lower corruption levels and higher educational 
potential.91 It seems plausible to suggest that Russian round-trip investors are those private 
actors who are closely tied to government officials (whether regional or federal) and who, 
under their protection, take advantage of profit-making opportunities in Russia with the 
idea that with impunity they will be able to later stash their profits abroad.  
 
Firms that have secured their assets in foreign institutions tend to return to their home 
countries only if they have preferential access to profit-making opportunities. Creating 
such access starts at the very top of the governmental pyramid.  Consider the awarding of 
exclusive contracts to individuals associated with Putin’s inner circle for domestic projects 
from Olympics construction to food production and textbook publishing.92 Such practices 
are so widely used at the regional and local levels that the proximity to regional governors 
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and city mayors is considered one of the best determinants of firms’ success in Russia.93 
These business elites that take advantage of weak institutions at home for profit 
maximization rely on the best of both worlds – secure institutions in the West to protect 
profits over the long term and weak institutions in Russia to get super-profits in the short 
term. Weak domestic institutions serve the interests of those asset holders closest to the 
political authorities. The logic of development over time suggests that only those with 
access to ‘political cover’ from the very top (the notorious Russian ‘roof’–-krysha) will be 
left with property. And success is likely to increase among those who understand the 
unwritten rules of the game, not only including the need for protection but also the 
requirements to pay bribes and provide tribute and rent sharing. 
 
Voting With Their Feet to Get Justice Abroad  
The growing reliance of Russian businesses on foreign courts to settle their disputes is yet 
another case of institutional arbitrage.  The London Court of International Arbitration 
(LCIA), the London Commercial Court (LCC, a division of the High Court) and the 
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce have become the most 
popular destinations used by businesses from Russia and the wider post-Soviet region for 
dispute resolution.94 The International Court of Arbitration headquartered in Paris and 
arbitration courts in Geneva, New York and other financial centers have also seen an 
increase in litigants from Russia although they are used less commonly.95   
 
Comprehensive statistical data on these practices are not yet available. We gathered data 
from LCIA’s director general’s reports from 2000 to 2013 on the arbitration cases filed to 
the court over that period and the nationality of the claimants and respondents (see Table 
2). There is a clear growth in demand for international arbitration services provided by the 
LCIA as demonstrated by the near doubling of the number of cases submitted for 
arbitration in this court. Reports in the years up to 2005 did not mention Russia by name, 
using instead ‘CIS’ to group together all the claimants from the post-Soviet region.  
Russian numbers start to be reported separately from 2005, with Kazakhstan and Ukraine 
replacing CIS in 2011. It is also not accidental that these reports add Cyprus and BVI into 
their accounting from 2004-2005.  The cases associated with these offshore centers are in 
all likelihood linked to Russian or other CIS businesses; as discussed earlier, these islands 
represented the top destination for capital flowing out of Russia. The figures are self-
explanatory. Starting in 2004-2005 businesses from Russia and other post-Soviet countries 
increasingly used the London Court of International Arbitration to resolve their disputes.  
So important have Russian clients become to LCIA that the court started in 2013 
organizing ‘Russian Arbitration Day’ in Moscow to discuss trends and developments in 
international commercial arbitration.96 
 
 
[table 2 here] 
 
 
There are also studies done by international law firms–-especially the key beneficiaries of 
these practices in London–-that try to track information on the use of the LCIA and the 
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LCC. Portland Legal Disputes, one such firm, analyzed High Court rulings between 2013-
2014 and found that litigants from Russia were second only to those from the United 
States and were followed by claimants and defendants from Kazakhstan.97 These disputes 
are frequently between Russian businesses and do not involve any foreign counterparts, 
although the Russian party almost always acts through their foreign registered affiliates.98 
In Table 3 we present a list of most notable litigation cases heard in London in the last ten 
years. They provide a glimpse, albeit selective in nature, into the actors and the stakes 
involved in these court battles.    
 
 
[table 3 here] 
 
 
Most of the cases in the list are about the ownership of significant Russian domestic assets 
with no direct relationship to England. Conflicts between Russian and non-Russian 
companies within the Eurasian region are also often settled in the UK, where British 
courts admit to taking the cases because in their view, if they are not adjudicated in the 
UK, they would not be adjudicated anywhere.99 Many Russian businesses agree in 
advance and in writing through the inclusion of a ‘governing law and jurisdiction’ clause 
that in the event of a conflict, UK or other named Western courts would be used to settle 
the dispute, even though the businessmen are Russian and the business is operating in  
Russia.100 Undoubtedly, they choose Western courts less out of absolute respect for law in 
general than out of the belief that their opponents’ opportunity to achieve a favorable 
ruling through force, bribery or ‘telephone justice’ will be limited outside Russia.101 
 
Besides dispute resolution in international courts, Russian businesses prefer placing most 
of their commercial transactions in contracts governed by English law.  Since the 1990s, 
most of Russia’s oil and gas exports have been placed under foreign law governed 
contracts.102  English law is also preferred in merger and acquisition transactions.103  Part 
of the attraction of Cyprus to Russian businesses is that Cypriot corporate law was based 
on an earlier version of the English Companies Act, making it compatible with 
contemporary UK law. Conflicts between Russian companies registered in Cyprus 
therefore can easily be adjudicated in UK courts.104 London is also important as a home to 
the London Stock Exchange, which Russian companies prefer over the New York Stock 
Exchange, with its stricter oversight by the US government’s Securities and Exchange 
Commission.105 
 
These preferences reflect the widespread perceptions that Russian laws are not 
competitive enough and not sufficiently robust to adjudicate large business transactions. 
As argued by Delphine Nougayrède, a practicing lawyer with work experience in Russia, 
although Russian contract and corporate laws have evolved from the early 1990s, there are 
many concerns remaining with regard to lacunae in Russia’s contract laws, including (1) 
their inability to protect “an innocent contracting party in the event of contractual breach 
by the other party;” (2) the absence of product warranties that would allow a purchaser to 
claim for loss in the event of defects in the object (or a company) that has been acquired; 
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and (3) the failure of the law to take into account the fact that completion of a transaction 
may be dependent on preceding conditions beyond their control.106 The same challenges 
apply to Russian corporate law insofar as it fails to protect minority shareholders and, until 
2009, failed to recognize and provide for shareholder agreements.107  
 
Nor do businessmen trust the Russian court system to be impartial. Nougayrède 
emphasizes the importance of a political risk factor – “the risk of discretionary 
deployment of the law by Russian state bodies as a weapon in pursuit of political or other 
extra-legal aims.”108 Many other analysts confirm that throughout the 2000s the state has 
become even more discretionary and predatory in its relationship with businesses at all 
levels. This is not an outcome to be expected from Olson’s predictions about the 
increasing use of rule-of-law to minimize risk while still maintaining profits.109     
 
A caveat is warranted. The strategy of exiting Russia’s institutional environment in favor 
of more effective foreign institutions is not a replacement for domestic rule of law and not 
a foolproof solution to institutional problems.  This ‘second-best’ solution works most of 
the time, as long as businessmen do not go against the regime and stay out of politics. 
Proximity to the top echelons of power is still vital, but also risky. Particularly at times of 
economic difficulties, state predation can affect even those parties that have been 
otherwise collaborating with the regime.110 Putin himself is said to have told the top 
oligarchs when reminding them that their wealthy lifestyle should not be confused with 
secure property rights: “A chicken can exercise ownership of eggs,” he said, “and it can 
get fed while it’s sitting on the egg. But it’s not really their egg.”111 In such circumstances 
exit emerges as the only privately optimal and sustainable strategy – a strategy that ever 
consolidates as businessmen undergo through a selection mechanism which leaves afloat 
only those that rely on weak institutions and personal connections to make profits. These 
actors, of course, do not have any interest in changing how these institutions work. The 
second-best solution thus emerges as the most effective strategy to secure returns from the 
economic activity made possible by these institutions.   
 
 
Global Capital and Domestic Institutions: Is There a Way Out?  
Good institutions are imperative for long-term economic growth and national prosperity. 
Accountable governments and the rule of law are essential to democratic governance 
around the world.  Scholars have largely converged on these basics. There is also a 
recognition that such treasured public goods are out of reach for many developing 
countries struggling with ineffective institutions and unaccountable governments.  
Institutional development appears to be a gradual process, immune to short-term policy 
interventions and tireless efforts by international organizations to improve them. There are 
important reasons for that. This study highlights the role of international structures – 
global financial and legal institutions  - in shaping the incentives of economic actors 
around the world and limiting their proclivities towards political action aimed at 
restraining the government and constructing more effective institutions at home.   
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The global institutional environment offers an institutional escape mechanism for 
economic actors confronted with ineffective and unstable institutions and political risks at 
home. Foregoing costly and, at times, risky organization and collective bargaining 
economic actors have an opportunity of exiting the system and using institutions 
elsewhere. This study explored the case of Russia – a state geopolitically critical to the 
rest of the world – that stepped on the path of institutional transformation and integration 
into the global economy in the early 1990s.  The process of transition in Russia resulted in 
the rise of new capital owners cleverly engaging in institutional arbitrage to make profits 
at home and use foreign institutions to protect their assets abroad, in more politically 
secure and institutionally-stable countries. Paradoxically, those who could commonly be 
expected to have the highest stakes in the development of functional rule-of-law 
institutions at home and the greatest capacity to lobby for their development have found a 
mechanism that allows them to resolve institutional problems without risky political 
action. In many cases these economic actors benefit from unpredictable institutional 
environment and have stakes in maintaining it in its present, highly suboptimal, state. 
Even when they are not directly benefitting from such environment and have an interest in 
changing it, the institutional effects of exit work “to atrophy the development of the art of 
voice.”112  
 
An important implication that emerges from this analysis is concerned with the 
questionable role of the West in this equation. After all, it is the most powerful western 
states (such as the US and the European powers) that set the rules underpinning the global 
financial system and set the agenda for change. Why did the West assume the role of a 
safe haven for the Russian capital, frequently obtained through illegal means? Why did it 
allow for institutional arbitrage to continue in the face of such adverse implications for the 
country’s institutions? What steps could and should have been taken to break this pattern, 
if any? After all, these practices worked to intensify the kleptocratic and rent-seeking 
tendencies in Russia, with the growing number of actors acquiring the means of practicing 
them. Indeed, the global actors made these practices easy and accessible as the offshore 
centers and international financial institutions catered to Russian clients (and indeed to 
largely any asset holders). In an ironic twist, with institutional foundations corrupted, the 
Russian state has morphed into an aggressive revanchist power, becoming a problem for 
the system that helped to create it and raising challenging questions as to ‘what went 
wrong’ and ‘who lost Russia’ after all.  
 
There are no simple answers and specific actors to blame. The global economy is 
underpinned by liberal principles of open access and separation of markets from politics: 
the model that privileges economic growth and efficiency and that has proven itself on 
economic growth indicators. The realization of institutional ‘traps’ and perverse incentives 
has been slow to surface, which is not very surprising.  The capital flowing out of one 
country and settling in another brings employment, prosperity and mega-profits to selected 
groups of professionals in investment banks, law firms, real estate industry and others. 
The loss of capital in Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, China, and Nigeria means the 
capital gain in London, New York, and Zurich.  
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The western governments are realizing the detrimental effects of money laundering 
through western institutions and the global work on ensuring the integrity of the global 
financial industry has begun as selected governments, civil society actors and international 
financial organizations advanced a new policy agenda designed to counteract financial 
abuse and manipulation. The US, Swiss and the UK governments have been at the 
forefront of these developments, promoting anti-money laundering rules and establishing 
new requirements for financial institutions and businessmen aimed at preventing tax 
evasion. International organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF and the OECD have 
also prioritized the development of new rules to ensure the global financial system’s 
integrity.  
 
But will these new policy developments help build stronger institutions in the developing 
countries? The marginal changes in the global structures are not likely to provide the 
magic bullet. The only hope of getting out of a structurally determined ‘exit trap,’ 
according to Hirschman, is activating the voice option.113 Whether the voice will come 
from the people frustrated with corruption (as has happened in Ukraine, Georgia and other 
countries) or disgruntled elites, the lessons learned from the last quarter century of 
transition about the structural constraints on institution-building should not be lost. The 
spillover from institutional deterioration in such countries as Russia is potentially 
extremely dangerous and costly for the West. The current realities of global institutional 
interdependence place a burden of special responsibility on the actors that benefit the most 
and have the greatest influence in shaping the rules governing the current global system.    
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Table 1.    Top Sources of Foreign Direct Investment to and from Russia 2009-13. 
($bln.)  
  
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2009-2013 % of 
the 
total 
Cyprus From Russia 129.7 179.1 136.5 179.3 193.6 818.2 34% 
To Russia 119.7 153.9 125.4 151.8 161.5 712.3 37% 
Netherlands From Russia 33.3 40 54.1 56.1 64.5 248 10% 
To Russia 24.6 39.7 56.9 65.6 60.8 247.6 13% 
The British Virgin  
Islands 
From Russia 36.6 51 56.2 50.1 26.3 220.2 9% 
To Russia 33.3 38.8 46 47.9 82.3 248.3 13% 
Bermuda From Russia 27.2 49.8 34.6 31.2 30.6 173.4 7% 
To Russia 2.2 11 3.6 3.6 3.5 23.9 1% 
Luxemburg From Russia 14.4 19.7 20.4 29.9 42.9 127.3 5% 
To Russia 14.8 12 12.1 9.1 11.3 59.3 3% 
Great Britain From Russia 6.4 7.8 6.3 7 23.1 50.6 2% 
To Russia 10.3 10.3 10.1 10 9.3 50 3% 
USA From Russia 13.9 5.2 2.8 3.5 18.6 44 2% 
To Russia 10.5 9.8 9.1 10.6 21.6 61.6 3% 
Switzerland From Russia 5.7 6.5 5.7 6.7 6.8 31.4 1% 
To Russia 7.7 9.3 12 12.4 12.9 54.3 3% 
Germany From Russia 15.3 23.1 17.3 19 19.2 93.9 4% 
To Russia 7.4 6.7 6.3 9.1 9.9 39.4 2% 
Gibraltar From Russia 10.2 5.8 5.9 0.3 0.3 22.5 1% 
To Russia 11.6 5.7 5.7 0.1 0.4 23.5 1% 
TOTAL From Russia 377.4 488.9 454.9 514.9 566.5 2402.6 100% 
To Russia 301.2 365.9 361.8 409.6 479.5 1918 100% 
 
Source: Central Bank of Russia, 2014. www.cbr.ru. 
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Table 2. Annual Arbitration Cases Filed at LCIA by selected countries of origin.  
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
UK 20% 18% 21% 22% 17% 21% 19% 16% 12% 13% 17% 18% 16% 19% 
North 
America/US 13% 10% 13% 16% 8% 13% 13% 10% 9% 7% 9% 9% 8% 7% 
Russia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3% 6% 2% 7% 12% 7% 5% 3% 3% 
Cyprus n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4% 3% 4% n.a. 4% 5% 7% 6% 5% 4% 
BVI n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5% n.a. 7% 6% 6% 5% 10% 4% 7% 
CIS 8% 6% 5% 6% 4% 2% 3% 4% 4% 4% 3% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Kazakhstan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2% 3% n.a. 
Ukraine n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4% n.a. n.a. 
Total # of 
cases 147 158 159 192 191 205 251 137 215 272 246 224 265 290 
Source: LCIA Director General Reports (2000-2013). 
http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/reports.aspx  
 
 
Table 3: Selected Litigation Cases Involving Russian Parties in the High Court of 
Justice (Commercial Division, LCC) 
 
Year Claimant/s Defendant/s Size in $ Place 
2006-2012 Cherney  Deripaska 4.35 bln  LCC 
2008-2012 Berezovsky Abramovich 5.5 bln  LCC 
2009-2010 Sibir Energy Chigirinksy/Cameron 400 mln LCC 
2010-2012 Slocom Trading Sibir 50.7 mln LCC 
2010-2013 Sovkomflot Skarga/Nikitin/Izmaylov n.a. LCC (dismissed) 
2011 VTB Capital MCP Managing Partner Malofeyev 225 mln LCC (dismissed) 
2011-2013 MTS Finance Altimo n.a. Isle of Man 
2011 Synergy RGI 99 mln  LCC 
2011-2014 VTB 
Pavel Skurikhin, Pikeville Investments LLP, and 
Perchwell Holdings LLP 20.1 mln LCC 
2012-2013 Aeroflot Berezovsky and Glushkov 62.9 mln LCC 
2012 Berezovsky MetalloInvest (Anisimov)  n.a. LCC 
2012 Samara region Berezovsky 31.7 mln LCC 
2012 Yukos Capital Rosneft 160 mln  LCC 
2012 Mutalibov Transaero 50.04 mln LCC 
2014 Moran Yacht & Ship, Inc  Pisarev 962,000  LCC 
2012 Bank of Moscow JFC Group 152 mln  LCC 
2013 VIS Trading  Ansol  n.a. LCC 
2013 Gorbunova Berezovsky 200 mln  LCC 
2013 Inteco (Baturina) Sylmord Trade/RusPetro (Chistyakov) 135.3 mln  LCC 
2012-2014 Otkritie  Urumov/Pinaev/Gersamia/Jemai/Jecot 175 mln  LCC 
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